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1Abstract: We explain per-capita income gaps across US states and
Canadian provinces by the following chain of causation. Geography deter-
mined where Europeans originally settled: in Northeastern USA, along those
segments of the Atlantic coast where the climate was neither too hot (the
US South), nor too cold (Canada). Higher population densities in this early
settled region have prevailed to this day. This has in turn aﬀected per-capita
incomes because densely populated areas are conducive to skill accumula-
tion; indicatively, many of the world’s top universities lie in this region.
Our ordinary least-squares regressions show university education having a
robust positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on per-capita incomes. To control for
endogeneity we run various instrumental-variable regressions: some where
education today is instrumented with e.g. population density in 1900; and
some where diﬀerent sets of geography variables (e.g. temperature) are used
as instruments. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the type of causal chain
described.
21 Introduction
This paper examines a novel link from geography to the distribution of per-
capita incomes across US states and Canadian provinces. The existing liter-
ature has often pointed to direct eﬀects of geography, in particular vicinity
to waterways and so-called natural harbors, to economic and demographic
outcomes. Coastal regions are richer and more populated because they have
more trading ports, goes the argument (see, in particular, Rappaport and
Sachs 2003).
This explanation fails to account for why the Eastern half of North Amer-
ica is richer and more densely populated than the Western half. It also fails
to explain diﬀerences in population and per-capita incomes along the At-
lantic coast: the US South and Atlantic Canada are relatively poor, and
New England is rich.
We believe there is something more involved than just a direct eﬀect
from geography. The way we think about these patterns relates to recent
work explaining per-capita income gaps across countries through a chain of
causation running from geography, via institutions, to current economic out-
comes.1 The econometric approach taken in this literature is to use variables
measuring geography and/or demography — such as settler mortality and pre-
colonial population density — as exogenous instruments for some measure of
institutions, for example an index over protection of property rights.
Using similar econometric techniques we document a related causal chain
within the “neo-European” region of the USA and Canada. This chain runs
from geography, via early settlement, population density, and education, to
economic outcomes today. To see the point, note that ﬁve of the the six
richest US states — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and
Delaware (see Table 1) — lie clustered in a belt along the Atlantic Ocean. This
region was the ﬁrst to be settled and from the start it has had the highest
1See Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) Easterly and Levine (2003), Glaeser et al. (2004),
Rodrick et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Banarjee and Iyer (2005), Lagerl¨ of (2005),
and Tabellini (2005).
3population densities in North America. Here lie some of the world’s largest
cities, like New York City and Boston, and highest ranked universities, such
as Harvard, MIT, Yale, Cornell, and Princeton.2 Surrounding states and
provinces have both sparser populations and lower per-capita incomes. (The
reader may note that states to the south were all slave states; we return to
this below.)
We propose that these patterns are due to geographical fundamentals
which made the ﬁrst Europeans settle in Northeastern USA: along the At-
lantic coast, and where the climate was neither too hot (like in the US South),
nor too cold (like in Canada). Early settlement has determined population
densities and the location of urban centers up to this day, in turn aﬀecting
per-capita incomes, because such dense and urban environments are con-
ducive to skill accumulation. This is also why so many top-ranked universi-
ties lie in this region.
We combine PPP adjusted per-capita income data across 50 US states and
10 Canadian provinces, with measures of geography (such as average annual
temperature, precipitation, and coastal dummies); population densities in
1900 and today; the sex ratio in 19003; urbanization rates today; and the
fraction of the population with a university degree today.
We ﬁrst run a number of ordinary least-squares regressions showing that
university education has a robust positive eﬀect on per-capita incomes. It
stays signiﬁcant when controlling for political variables (such as the size of
government and unionization); sectoral composition (like ﬁsheries employ-
ment); and a Canada dummy.
We then run a number of two-stage least squares regressions where univer-
2One could add to this cluster Rhode Island, which is also densely populated and has
an Ivy League university (Brown). However, it is not as rich as the other ﬁve (see Table
1). Interestingly, in 1840 Rhode Island was the richest state in the union, followed by
those other ﬁve states; see Easterlin (1960, Table A-1). Why Rhode Island fell behind is
a topic left for another paper.
3As discussed later, the sex ratio (the number of men per woman) is known in many
other contexts to be negatively correlated with urbanization.
4sity education is instrumented with historical variables (population density
in 1900, the sex ratio in 1900, and slavery in 1850). We ﬁnd that these histor-
ical variables are good instruments for university education, in the sense that
they are highly correlated with university education and uncorrelated with
the second-stage residual. That is, they seem to aﬀect per-capita incomes
through education, rather than directly.
The same conclusion holds when running other instrumental-variable re-
gressions treating population density, the sex ratio, urbanization rates, and
university education as endogenous. These are instrumented with various sets
of geography variables, such as temperature, rainfall and coastal dummies.
Again we ﬁnd that the instruments are valid: these geography variables seem
to aﬀect economic outcomes not directly but rather through their inﬂuence
on, for example, population density and education.
I ns h o r t ,o u rr e s u l t ss u g g e s tt h a tt h o s eﬁve Northeastern states are so
rich and densely populated because they lie by the Atlantic coast and have
a climate which was inviting to settlers: neither too hot, nor too cold. For
the same reason, their too hot, too cold, and too inland neighboring states
and provinces are relatively poor and empty today.
We believe the value-added of this exercise is four-fold. First, as ar-
gued already, our methodology relates closely to a new empirical develop-
ment literature on geography, institutions, and income gaps. However, we
seem to be the ﬁrst to think about variation in per-capita incomes within a
rich and “Neo-European” region, such as the US and Canada, using a sim-
ilar instrumental-variable approach as, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2001,
2002).4
Second, we propose and test a link from geography to economic outcomes
4There is an empirical literature on income gaps and convergence across US states
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Mitchener and McLean 2003, Berkowitz and Clay 2004).
However, none of these use geography variables as instruments for population density
and/or education, and do not merge data from US states and Canadian provinces. The
only income comparisons across US states and Canadian provinces that we know of is an
annual report published by the Fraser Institute (see Karabegovi´ c et al. 2004).
5which has been largely ignored in the existing literature: demographic and
educational variables. This contrasts with e.g. Rappaport and Sachs (2003)
who suggest that geography exerts a direct eﬀect on economic outcomes
across US regions, for example by aﬀecting trade. It also contrasts with
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), and many others, who emphasize institutions
(such as property rights) as the intermediate factor between geography and
economic outcomes. Within the region we study institutions cannot (other
than in a very broad sense) be the only factor involved, since much of the
variation in per-capita incomes shows up across institutionally similar states
and provinces (like New England and Atlantic Canada). Much of the causal-
ity rather seems to run through the rise of urban centers, and the eﬀect
these have had on learning and human-capital accumulation.5 This is also
consistent with a vast literature ﬁnding that shorter geographical distances
facilitate skill accumulation (as discussed in Section 2.3).
Third, we do look at one particular institutional link from geography to
economic outcomes: slavery. This institution arose in those regions of the
Americas where the climate was suitable to grow staple crops like cotton,
tobacco, and sugar: that is, in the Caribbean, Brazil, and the US South.6
Slavery has had well-documented negative eﬀects on institutions (in the sense
of, for instance, voting rights and school reforms), on equality, and on per-
capita incomes today. This holds in our data too. More interestingly, how-
ever, not only does slavery have a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on per-capita
incomes in our regressions; including a slavery variable strengthens the ef-
fect from population density. In some regressions the eﬀect from population
5In a sense, one could argue that our story partly mirrors the growth of Europe’s
Atlantic regions following the discovery of the Americas (cf Acemoglu et al. 2005). It also
relates to Glaeser et al. (2004) who think that European settlers brought not (only) their
institutions, but (also) their human capital, although we suggest that population density
and urbanization can by itself be a factor behind human capital accumulation and the rise
of universities.
6See Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000), Mariscal and Sokoloﬀ (2000), Engerman and
Sokoloﬀ (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2002), and Lagerl¨ of (2005).
6density is signiﬁcant only when we control for slavery. The intuition is that
many former slave states are poorer today than their population densities
alone would account for. Slavery picks up some of the variation in incomes,
thereby also making the population density eﬀect stronger. In that sense,
the population-density link and the institutional link seem complimentary.
Fourth, we may add insights to a literature on diﬀerences in incomes
and other variables across OECD countries, in particular between European
countries and the US (Alesina et al. 2001, Gordon 2004, Prescott 2004,
Rogerson 2005). Our methodology is a little diﬀerent: we do not focus on
labor supply or taxes; we run regressions rather than calibrating models;
and (to iterate) we are the ﬁrst to look at variation within the US-Canada
region. However, our results may be interesting in light of this literature
because Canada shares so many characteristics with both Europe and the
US. (We return to this discussion in the conclusions in Section 4.)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next Section 2 elaborates
on the theory we wish to put forward and discusses how it seems to ﬁt
with the data. Section 3 presents the results, ﬁrst when regressing per-
capita incomes on university education and a number of control variables
using ordinary least-squares, and then using various instrumental-variable
approaches. Section 4 ends with a concluding discussion.
2 The theory and some preliminary evidence
The hypothesis that we are about to investigate can be summarized in a ﬂow
chart, as follows:
Geography ⇒ early settlement
⇒ population density in 1900
⇒ population density today ⇒ accumulation of skills
⇒ per-capita income levels.
A correlation matrix for some of the variables involved is found in Table
2. Next we discuss the links in more detail.
72.1 Geography and population density in 1900
The ﬁrst link runs from geography to early settlement. The earliest year
for which we have population density data for most states and provinces
is around 1900 (only data for Newfoundland is missing). Consider Figure
1 which plots average annual temperature against log population density
in 1900. Consistent with Rappaport and Sachs (2003) it can be seen that
Atlantic and other coastal states and provinces have higher densities than
those located inland, at any given temperature (see Table 1 for a list of codes
for all states and provinces). It also seems that the relationship between
temperature and population density is ∩-shaped; very hot and very cold
states and provinces are less densely populated than those at intermediate
temperatures.
This ∩- s h a p e dr e l a t i o n s h i pi se v e nm o r es t r i k i n gw h e nl o o k i n go n l ya t
the Atlantic region which is relatively homogenous in terms of, for example,
mountainousness and rainfall (see Figure 2). As described in the introduc-
tion, densities are high in a couple of Northeastern states and lower both to
the north and the south of these. Note that there is nothing special about
Canada, aside from the weather: in Figure 2 the ﬁtted curve for US states
only (dashed) is virtually identical to the ﬁtted curve for states and provinces
together (solid). Temperature thus accounts for Canada’s sparse population.
Why does temperature have a non-monotonic eﬀect on settlement? It
makes sense that early settlers in North America, who were mostly farmers,
avoided too cold regions due to their lower agricultural productivity.7 (The
exception may be regions where they could procure food from ﬁshing.) Hot
regions may have been unsuitable for European settlers in particular, since
they were not resistent to warm-weather diseases (Acemoglu et al. 2001;
Coelho and McGuire 1997, 1999). Moreover, much of the migration to the
warmer parts of the US were not by free Europeans but by African slaves,
7Also in pre-agricultural times humans avoided cold regions probably reﬂecting avail-
ability of food. Anthropologists have noted that density of “cultures” is higher in warmer
and wetter regions of the world (Collard and Foley 2002).
8without whom population density in the South would have been even lower.
As discussed below, geography also seems to have had an eﬀect on incomes
through slavery, separate from the population density link.
Other geography variables which seem to have mattered is the number
of rainy days per year (Figure 3) and total precipitation (Figure 4). These
probably aﬀected agricultural productivity.
All coasts, not only the Atlantic, have higher population densities than
inland regions, and so do states and provinces around the Great Lakes. How-
ever, the Atlantic is more densely populated than both the Gulf and Paciﬁc
coasts (see, for example, Map 2 in Rappaport and Sachs 2003; in fact, the
whole eastern half of the US is more densely populated than the western half).
The most probable explanation is that the Atlantic is closer to Europe, which
is where most early settlers arrived from. Many immigrants stayed in the big
cities where their ships landed. Trans-Atlantic trade may also have had an
impact on early growth of the Atlantic region of North America, as it did on
the European side of the Atlantic (Acemoglu et al. 2005).
2.2 Population density in 1900 and today
Despite migration to, from, and within North America log population density
in 1900 is highly correlated with log population density in 2001 (Table 2
and Figure 5). One may note that places like Arizona and Nevada have
had relatively fast population growth over the last century, probably due
to inventions like air-conditioning (Rappaport 2004). Others, like Prince
Edward Island, have seen population numbers fall. But here we do not want
to focus on why some regions have grown and others contracted. Rather we
want to emphasize what really stands out in Figure 5: that those states and
provinces which were the most densely populated in 1900 are so still today.
92 . 3 P o p u l a t i o nd e n s i t ya n de d u c a t i o n
The idea that a shorter geographical distance between people enhances the
exchange of ideas and accumulation of skills goes back at least to Jacobs
(1969), and probably much longer (Glaeser 1999 quotes Alfred Marshall on
agglomeration eﬀects). Empirical support can be found in, for example,
Jaﬀe et al. (1993), who show that patent citations are negatively related
to distance. Glaeser and Mar´ e (2001) ﬁnd that wages are higher in cities
because cities promote learning rather than the reverse causality by which
skilled people choose to live in cities. Theoretical foundations can be found
in, for example, Glaeser (1999).
It is also possible that colleges and universities, due to scale eﬀects in
education, have come to be located in regions with dense populations, both
historically and today. Many Ivy League universities lie in the densely pop-
ulated region around Northeastern USA, and vicinity to educational insti-
tutions seems to matter for educational choice: Card (1995) ﬁnds that men
who grew up near a four-year college have higher education and earnings,
also when controlling for regional factors and family background; Glaeser
and Saiz (2003) ﬁnd that cities of a given size grow faster if they have more
colleges per capita. A skilled labor force can also attract high-technology
industries (Henderson et al. 1995).
2.3.1 Urbanization
Obviously, population per unit of land area over a whole state or province
may not be the best measure of the mechanism we try to capture. Ideally
one would want a measure of how well “connected” people are to the type
of social networks which build skills and/or enhance growth of high-skilled
industries. Alternatively one may want data over how far the average resident
of a state or province is from the closest university or college.
Lacking any such data we look at urbanization rates for 2000. This is pos-
itively correlated with log population density in 2001 (see Table 2 and Figure
6). The ﬁt is not terribly good, however, possibly because the urbanization
10measure we use is the fraction of the population living in cities exceeding
the modest size of 1,000 people (we use this measure because it is the most
comparable between Canada and the US). The fraction living in larger cities
could perhaps have provided a better ﬁt.8 Moreover, urbanization rates may
not be exactly the right measure either: population density may just as well
serve as a proxy for whatever is the “true” measure.
These issues aside, we note that the signs are right: both log popula-
tion density in 2001 and our measure of urbanization rates are positively
correlated with the fraction of the population having a university degree (ur-
banization slightly less than population density; see Table 2 and Figures 7
and 8).
2.3.2 The sex ratio in 1900
We do not have historical urbanization data (at least not for both Canada
and the US) but a good proxy could be the sex ratio, that is, the number of
men per woman. Edlund (2005) documents that rural areas in the Western
world are relatively short on women, compared to urban areas. This seems
particularly true in new settlements in colonial times. Guttentag and Secord
(1983, Ch. 5) document that in frontier societies of the US men vastly
outnumbered women into the 20th century, while the situation was rather
the opposite in New England. (See also Angrist 2002.) This ﬁts with our
data, where the sex ratio in 1900 is strongly negatively correlated with log
population density (Figure 11).
2.4 Education and per-capita incomes
The fraction with a university degree is highly positively correlated with
per-capita incomes, notably more so than are population density in 2001
8We did look at data over the population sizes of diﬀerent cities, in order to estimate
the number of people living in cities with, for example, 100,000 people or more. Given
that we look at state and province data, however, one problem with that approach is that
many cities belong to more than one state or province.
11and urbanization (see Table 2). This suggests that the link from population
density and urbanization to per-capita incomes does work through human
capital.
2.5 Slavery
As seen in Figures 14 and 15 the fraction slaves in the population in 1850
varies with geographical variables, such as temperature and rainfall, which
facilitated the growth of staple crops (see the discussion in the introduction).
Slavery also seems to impact per-capita incomes and education today. The
link is there when considering all states and provinces (Figure 16), and (more
visibly) among slave states (Figures 17 and 18). Slavery thus constitutes a
link from geography to economic outcomes, which does not work through
population density.
3 Regression results
3.1 Ordinary least-squares regressions
Table 3 presents the ordinary least-squares results when regressing log per-
capita income (GSP or GPP) on the fraction having a university degree and
a number of other variables. University education has a high explanatory
power on its own [an R-squared of 52.3% in column (1)]. It also stays very
signiﬁcant when controlling for a range of other control variables.
In all speciﬁcations but the ﬁr s tw ee n t e raC a n a d ad u m m y ,w h i c hi s
mostly insigniﬁcant. One may note that it is consistently positive: when
controlling for levels of university education (and a number of other variables)
Canada does not seem to be poorer than the US, but rather richer. However,
the Canada dummy tends to have a negative sign in the second stage of some
of the instrumental-variable regressions shown later.
Some political variables are signiﬁcant. Consider ﬁrst the variables from
the Fraser Institute, indicated by FI in Table 3. Among these, the size of
12government, discriminatory taxation, and union density come out as signiﬁ-
cant (union density barely). These variables, however, are hard to interpret.
They are all 1-10 indices, and it is not even always clear what a high or low
score means (see Section A.3.6 in the appendix). Moreover, even though the
sources do describe some of the details about how the FI variables are com-
puted, the raw data is not provided and we have not been able to replicate
these indices.
There is another problem with the FI variables. We computed an al-
ternative set of political variables, with a clearer interpretation: the ratio
of federal, state, and local government expenditure to incomes. As seen in
column (10) of Table 3, a high ratio of federal expenditure to income has a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on per-capita income. But the direction of causal-
ity is far from obvious. Notably, this variable is the highest and lowest for
two Canadian provinces: Prince Edward Island (which is the poorest of all
60 states and provinces), and Alberta (the richest Canadian province). This
probably reﬂects the Canadian federal government’s choices in response to
existing income gaps, rather than exogenous causes behind the gaps. In other
words, Ottawa does not make Albertans rich by not giving them money; they
are rich and thus do not get any money.
The state and local spending ratios, on the other hand, are more plausible
causes of per-capita income diﬀerences. However, as seen in column (11) and
(12) these are insigniﬁcant, and of the “wrong” sign, respectively (that is, a
bigger local government is associated with higher per-capita incomes).
Moreover, out of the three ratios the federal one is the most strongly
correlated with FI’s size-of-government variable (the correlation coeﬃcient is
−0.83). This is not strange because the FI variable is based on similar data.
However, it does suggest that the size of government as measured by the
Fraser Institute shows up as signiﬁcant in these regressions, not because it
causes income gaps, but rather because it is caused by existing gaps through
federal expenditure.
Another set of variables measures the sectoral composition of the state’s
13or province’s labor force. The employment share in ﬁsheries has a negative,
but statistically insigniﬁcant, eﬀect on per-capita incomes [column (14)]; the
employment share in natural resources industries (mostly oil and gas) has a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect [column (15)]. See also Figures 12 and 13.
However, data over ﬁshery employment is available for only 33 states
and provinces, and natural resource employment for 55 states and provinces.
Most of the variation is among a few states and provinces, like Alaska, Al-
berta, and Atlantic Canada (cf Figures 12 and 13). Endogeneity is also an
issue. Canada’s Atlantic provinces may have come to rely more on ﬁshery
today because when ﬁshery began its decline the labor force did not move
into other sectors. Whatever prevented the growth of non-ﬁshery industries
should be the ultimate cause of current income gaps; we believe that cause
is population density and education.
To sum up, the results shown in Table 3 suggest that university educa-
tion has a robust positive and signiﬁcant relationship with per-capita income
levels. However, it is not clear whether education causes these income gaps,
or if the causality goes the other way around. To address that issue we next
turn to instrumental-variable analysis.
3.2 Two-stage least squares regressions
3.2.1 Historical variables as instruments
Table 4 shows the results from some two-stage least squares regressions
where university education is instrumented for using three historical vari-
ables. These are: log population density in 1900, the sex ratio (the number
of men per woman) in 1900, and the fraction slaves in the population in 1850.
Each of these variables is theoretically a good candidate for an instrument.
We have already argued that population density can exert a causal impact
on human-capital accumulation, and that the sex ratio may serve as a useful
proxy for urbanization. (One shortcoming with the sex ratio is that data is
missing for 8 states and provinces.) Slavery seems to have had a negative
14impact on education (cf Figure 18). The ultimate reason should be that slaves
were often forbidden (or otherwise prevented) from learning to read or write.
Also after abolition these eﬀects seem to have lingered on. School reforms
have tended to come later in formerly slave-dependent Caribbean countries
and Brazil compared to Canada and the US north of the Chesapeake Bay
(Mariscal and Sokoloﬀ 2002), and there are indications of similar patterns
within the US South (Lagerl¨ of 2005).
Using measures from 1850 and 1900, rather than today, could also help
alleviate some reverse-causality concerns: for example, high levels of educa-
tion (and income) today may spur migration to cities today, but population
density a century back seems more likely to causally impact education today,
rather than the other way around. (However, there are some caveats to this
reasoning, as discussed below.)
The two-stage least squares results in Table 4 show that per-capita income
is aﬀected positively by the fraction with a university degree. This holds when
this fraction is instrumented with the slavery variable, together with either
log population density [column (1)], or the sex ratio [column (2)], as well as
when using all three variables as instruments [column (3)].
To be valid instruments these variables should ﬁrst of all be highly corre-
lated with the instrumented variable. As seen in the lower panel of Table 4,
the ﬁrst-stage regressions do not have a very high R-squared (about 15%).
However, an F-test shows that the instruments are jointly signiﬁcant. More-
over, although the ﬁrst-stage estimated coeﬃcients on log population density
and the sex ratio are insigniﬁcant, their signs are the expected ones. That
is, log population density has a positive eﬀect on education, whereas slav-
ery and the sex ratio have negative eﬀects. However, the sex ratio gets the
wrong sign when entered jointly with log population density since these two
variables are highly correlated.
For the instruments to be good they should also not inﬂuence the depen-
dent variable (log per-capita income) other than through the instrumented
variable (the fraction with a university degree). In other words, the in-
15struments should be uncorrelated with the error terms in the second-stage
regression. This seems to be the case: Hansen’s J-test does not reject the
hypothesis that the second-stage error terms are uncorrelated with the in-
struments; that is, the p-value is very high (well above conventional risk
levels of 5% or 10%). To see that the instruments do not exert any direct
impact on per-capita incomes we also report the results when letting each
instrument enter the second-stage regression [columns (4) to (6)]. As seen,
they all come out as insigniﬁcant.
All in all, it seems that these historical variables are valid instruments.
However, in order to truly believe that they are valid we must also believe
that the direction of causality runs from the instruments (population den-
sity, the sex ratio, and slavery) to the instrumented variable (the fraction
with university degree). The fact that the instruments date a century, or
longer, back in time is no guarantee that this is the case. For example, some
third factor may have made some states and provinces rich and highly edu-
cated, and thus induced migrants to settle there, and thereby also made the
economy less dependent on slave labor. In principle, what regions become
prosperous and densely populated may be due to chance, and work through
the coordination of many agents’ simultaneous decisions. However, we have
already argued that there is one fundamental determinant of settlement in
North America: geography.
3.2.2 Geography as instruments
Our story builds around a chain of causation. Geography mattered for where
Europeans originally settled which has come to determine population densi-
ties today which has impacted per-capita income patterns because densely
populated regions (cities) are conducive to skill accumulation. To test this hy-
pothesis using an instrumental-variable approach we must make two choices.
First, we must decide what set of geography variables (temperature etc.)
to use as instruments. Second, we must choose what intermediate variables
(that is, what links in the chain: population density, education, etc.) to be
16instrumented. Generally, the results depend on how these choices are made:
some instruments do a better job together with some endogenous (instru-
mented) variables; other combinations do not work equally well.
A smaller set of geography instruments Table 5 shows the results
from a couple of two-stage least squares regressions where as instruments we
use annual temperature and its square, and an Atlantic dummy (cf Figures 1
and 2). These are used to instrument log population density in 1900 or 2001,
or the sex ratio in 1900. The dependent variable is log per-capita income.
As seen from the odd-numbered columns [(1), (3), and (5)], the results
seem discouraging at ﬁrst: for none of the three instrumented variables is the
coeﬃcient in the second-stage regression signiﬁcant at any conventional risk
level.
However, we recall from Figures 14 to 18 and the results in Table 4 that
geography aﬀects education and per-capita income also through slavery. We
thus allow the fraction slaves in 1850 to enter the regression as an endogenous
variable [columns (2), (4), and (6)]. As seen, not only does slavery come out
as signiﬁcant — the other three instrumented variables do too (at least at the
10% level), and they are also larger in size.
This result is quite interesting. We may think of slavery as an institutional
variable capturing a source of per-capita income gaps similar to the historic
forces at play in other regions of the Americas. As we discussed earlier,
such mechanisms are emphasized by, for example, Sokoloﬀ and Engerman
(2000), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002), and
Lagerl¨ of (2005). They argue that geographical fundamentals like soil and
climate lead to the introduction of slave-based plantation production, which
lead to post-abolition inequality, and growth retarding institutions. Here we
focus on another chain of causation: from geography to the locations of early
settlements, population density up to this day, and skill accumulation in such
densely populated areas. This is somewhat related to an argument made by
Glaeser et al. (2004): that European settlers may have brought their human
17capital rather than institutions. So, in our data, does geography aﬀect per-
capita incomes through population density or through institutions? The
answer is: both. It is not a matter of either/or; in fact, the eﬀect from
population density is seen only when controlling for institutions (that is,
slavery).9
To understand why consider the plot of per-capita incomes and log popu-
lation density in 2001 in Figure 9. As seen, those states which had the highest
fraction slaves — Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana — are outliers.
They are thus poorer than their population densities can account for. When
entering slavery into the regressions it picks up some of that variation in
incomes, in eﬀect making the population density eﬀect stronger.
It is also interesting to note from the even-numbered columns in Table 5
that the Canada dummy comes out as signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage regression
but not in the second-stage regression when the instrumented variable is log
population density in 2001; and vice versa when the instrumented variable
is historical: either log population density in 1900 or the sex ratio in 1900.
That is, there was nothing special about Canada by 1900: the sex ratios and
population densities of Canadian provinces can be explained by geography.
However, there is a negative “Canada eﬀect” working after 1900 both on
contemporary per-capita incomes and population densities.
The even-numbered columns of Table 5 also show that the instruments
are good, in the sense that they perform well by Hansen’s overidentiﬁcation
test: zero correlation between the instruments and the second-stage residuals
cannot be rejected based on the J-test, with p-values around 23-28%. The
instruments are also jointly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage regression, as seen
from the F-test in the lower panel (although the temperature variables do a
poor job for the sex ratio).
9A sw es h a l ls e es o o n ,i ts e e m st h a te v e nt h o u g hp o p u l a t i o nd e n s i t ya n ds l a v e r ya r et w o
diﬀerent links between geography and economic outcomes, both work through education.
18A larger set of geography instruments Not only temperature and
vicinity to the Atlantic have had an impact on population density. In Table 6
we use a larger set of geography variables as instruments. These are: average
temperature and its square, average precipitation, average number of rainy
days, and coastal dummies: for the Atlantic only in odd-numbered columns;
and for the Atlantic and the Great Lakes in even-numbered.
We now use as endogenous (instrumented) variables log population den-
sity in 1900 and 2001, as well as two variables through which these have
supposedly aﬀected per-capita incomes: urbanization rates, and university
education. Slavery is also treated as endogenous and instrumented with the
same variables (we do not report the ﬁrst-stage regression).
Again, as seen in Table 6, we ﬁnd that the instrumented variables overall
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on per-capita incomes, most with p-values below 5%.
When we instrument urbanization rates the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant when using
the Atlantic dummy only [column (5)], but becomes signiﬁcant at the 10%
level when adding the Great Lakes dummy [column (6)].
The instruments seem to be valid too. The F-test in the ﬁrst-stage re-
gression suggests the instruments are jointly signiﬁcant (even though many of
the instruments are individually highly insigniﬁcant). Also, Hansen’s J-test
for overidentiﬁcation suggests that the instruments are uncorrelated with the
residuals in the second-stage regression.
We may also note that slavery comes out as insigniﬁcant when university
education is instrumented but not when population density is instrumented.
This suggests that the negative eﬀect from slavery to economic outcomes
works through education. This is consistent with, for example, Mariscal and
Sokoloﬀ (2000) and Lagerl¨ of (2005).
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
In 1999, out of 60 US states and Canadian provinces Connecticut was the
richest with a per-capita Gross State Product of US$46,245. Prince Ed-
19ward Island was the poorest with a per-capita Gross Province Product of
US$20,545. Their per-capita income ratio was thus about 2.25. This paper
is about explaining such income gaps.
One may argue that this is not an interesting research topic: 2.25 is not
a huge gap by international standards; across countries per-capita income
gaps can exceed a factor of 30 or 40. One reason that we still ﬁnd this
topic interesting is that diﬀerent North American regions share a lot (though
not everything) in geography, history, institutions, language, and ethnicity.
Comparing income gaps across states and provinces of North America thus
amounts to keeping such factors constant, to some extent, and this can teach
us a great deal also about cross-country income gaps.
Our explanation builds around a chain of causation. Geography mat-
tered for where Europeans settled which determined where cities and urban
centers are located today. This has impacted per-capita income patterns be-
cause cities are conducive to skill accumulation. We test this hypothesis with
various instrumental variable speciﬁcations and the data does not reject it.
Population density may play some role for cross-country income gaps
too: it usually shows up with a positive sign in per-capita income regressions
(Olson 1996), and city-states like Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and Singapore
are rich. However, it seems plausible that in a world-wide context geography
may exert a much stronger eﬀect through institutions; in the region we study
the population-density eﬀect shows up more clearly because the US and
Canada have so similar institutions.
Some would suggest other explanations than those we propose. Within
the US-Canada region the poorest locations lie in Atlantic Canada (Table
1). It may thus be tempting to attribute income gaps across this region
to variations in the dependence on ﬁshery. But this is not an exhaustive
explanation, we argue. There are other poor regions which do not rely on
ﬁshery (West Virginia is landlocked and almost as poor as Nova Scotia);
Alaska is rich and has a relatively large fraction of its employment in ﬁshery.
Fishery data is only available for 33 states and provinces, only a few of these
20have any signiﬁcant ﬁshery industries, and our regression results are not too
supportive of a ﬁshery explanation (see Section 3 and Figure 13).
Moreover, it is not obvious why the decline of one sector of the economy
would necessarily mean the decline of a whole region. If ﬁshery has declined,
w h yh a v ep e o p l ep r e v i o u s l ye m p l o y e di nt h eﬁsheries not moved to other
sectors? Consider Massachusetts, a maritime region which once had a ﬁshery
a n dw h a l i n gi n d u s t r y ,a n di sr i c ht o d a ya n dn o td e p e n d e n to nﬁshery. What
m a k e sN o v aS c o t i ad i ﬀerent from Massachusetts? Why could not Halifax be
like Boston? A good explanation should be deeper than simply pointing to
the decline of some sector of the economy. It should point to fundamental
causes (like geography), rather than proximate.
Our results are also interesting when thinking about income gaps between
European countries, US states, and Canadian provinces. The fact that the
richest regions of the United States are the most densely populated suggests
that per-capita income gaps between Europe and the US cannot be explained
by the same factor, since most European countries are poorer and more
densely populated than the US. Some would explain Europe’s relative poverty
by emphasizing that the US has a smaller government, lower taxes, and a less
regulated labor market. In the US-Canada case such explanations have been
put forward by the Fraser Institute. We do not rule such explanations out
but here they do not seem to tell the whole story. For example, we ﬁnd that
while government expenditure (relative to income) is negatively correlated
with per-capita income, the correlation holds only for federal expenditures
but not for state and local. The causation thus seems to go from poverty to
spending, rather than the other way around. That is, poor regions receive
more transfers from benevolent politicians in Ottawa and Washington.
One may also note that those ﬁve rich Northeastern states listed in
the introduction — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and
Delaware — all voted for John Kerry in 2004. In many ways they seem to
resemble Europe (or Canada) in their political preferences. If conservative
policies made these states rich they were hardly chosen by the states’ own
21electorates. The diﬀerences in policies between the US and Europe (and
Canada) may rather originate in diﬀerences in political institutions, as sug-
gested by Alesina et al. (2001): the political and electoral system in the
US makes it harder for socialist parties to establish themselves. One could
even hypothesize that maybe those rich Northeastern states would have been
poorer if they had been able to elect their own federal administrations and
imposed European-style labor laws and tax codes. Ironically, it may be voters
in poorer “red” states inland who ensure the prosperity of more left-leaning
voters in Massachusetts by keeping conservative and low-tax politicians in
the White House. This hypothesis relates to how some on the political left
in the US see things: see, for example, Thomas Frank’s (2005) “What’s the
Matter with Kansas?”
22A Data appendix
Below we list our data sources, some of which are available online only. When
it is not self-explanatory we try to describe in as much detail as possible what




A.1.1 Temperature, precipitation, and rainy days
Data for three weather variables were retrieved from the Weatherbase Web
site at www.weatherbase.com. These are: average temperature over the year
(in degrees Fahrenheit); average precipitation (inches of rainfall over the
year); and average number of rainy days per year.
Where available these refer to the capital of the state or province (see
Table 1 for a list). Else another city was chosen alphabetically. For tem-
perature and precipitation, data from Nova Scotia refer to Ecum Secum; all
other temperature and precipitation data refer to the capital.
Rainy days data for capitals were often missing, in which case we used
data for these cities: Banﬀ, Alberta; Abbotsford, British Columbia; Brandon,
Manitoba; Belle Isle, Newfoundland; Ecum Secum, Nova Scotia; Armstrong,
Ontario; Alma, Quebec; Bowling Green, Kentucky; Aberdeen, Maryland;
Alexandria, Minnesota; Belton, Missouri; Battle Mountain, Nevada; Atlantic
City, New Jersey. For all other states and provinces we used the capital.
A.1.2 Coastal dummies
The following states and provinces are considered to be located on the At-
lantic coast: New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, Quebec, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
23Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.10
The following states and provinces are considered to be located by the
Great Lakes: Ontario, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
A.2 Historical variables
A.2.1 The fraction slaves in 1850
The fraction slaves in the population is calculated as the total number of
slaves in 1850 over total population in 1850. This data is made available
by the Geospatial and Statistical Data Center at the University of Virginia
Library. Their Web site is at:
http://ﬁsher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus/
Canada did not use slavery.
A.2.2 The sex ratio in 1900
The numbers of males and females in Canada refer to the year 1901 and are
from Census of Canada (1902, Table III).
The corresponding data for the US were extracted from the Geospatial
and Statistical Data Center, University of Virginia Library (see the previous
section; click on 1900 and follow the links).
Note that the Canadian data is for 1901 and the US data is for 1900, but
we refer to this variable as the sex ratio in 1900.
10Depending on whether the Delaware Bay belongs to the Atlantic, or not, we could
categorize Pennsylvania as Atlantic; we decided not to, but few results would change if we
did.
24A.2.3 Population density in 1900
The Canadian population density data are from Series A54-66: Population
density per square mile, Canada and provinces, 1871 to 1976, Statistics
Canada (1983).
US population density is from Table 5, Statistical abstract of the United
States 1901, which is available at
http://www.census.gov/statab/www/
Note that the Canadian data is for 1901 and the US data is for 1900, but
we refer to this variable as population density in 1900.
A.3 Contemporary variables
A.3.1 GDP per capita
PPP adjusted GDP per capita for both Canadian provinces and US states
are from the Web site Demographia run by the Wendell Cox Consultancy, at
www.demographia.com. All ﬁgures are for 1999 and in current US dollars.
The exact links are:
http://www.demographia.com/db-cangdpr99.htm (for Canada)
http://www.demographia.com/db-usgdpr99.htm (for the US)
Note that the state and province level equivalents of GDP are called GSP
(Gross State Product) and GPP (Gross Province Product), respectively. In
the text we also call this variable per-capita income for short.
A.3.2 Fishery and natural resource data
Natural resource employment By employment in natural resource in-
dustries we mean, for Canada, employment in mining and oil and gas extrac-
tion. These numbers are from Statistics Canada (2002, Table A.32). The
numbers for the US are people employed in natural resource and mining
industries, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, available online at:
25http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=sm
For both Canada and the US the numbers are from 2000.
Fishery employment The number of people employed in ﬁsheries in Canada
are downloaded electronically from the Statistics Canada Web site, at www.statcan.ca.
To access the data, select census; select data; select topic-based tabulations;
click on number 11 — “Canada’s workforce: paid work.” Table 8 provides the
number of people employed by industry and province.
The US data are from Pritchard (2003, p. 95), under the category “em-
ployment, craft, and plants.” The US data refer to total employment in both
the ﬁsh-processing and wholesale industry.
For both Canada and the US these numbers are from 2001.
Total employment To get ﬁshery and natural resource employment as
fractions of total employment we use the following data. For Canadian
provinces, 2000 and 2001 total employment is from Statistics Canada (2003,
Table 18), available online at www.statcan.ca.
For the US total employment in 2000 is from Table 572, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 2001, US Census Bureau, available online at
http://www.census.gov/statab/www/. Total employment for 2001 is from
Table 565, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2002, also available on-
line at http://www.census.gov/statab/www/.
A.3.3 Urbanization rates
Our measure of the urbanization rate is the fraction of the population liv-
ing in an urban area with 1,000 persons or more. For Canadian provinces
the data were downloaded electronically from the Statistics Canada Web
site, www.statcan.ca, following these steps: select census; select data; select
population and dwelling counts; select “urban and rural.”
26For the US the corresponding numbers are from the US Census Bureau’s
2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent data (Table P2), available online
at http://factﬁnder.census.gov.
For both Canada and the US these numbers are from 2000.
A.3.4 Population density in 2001
Population density per square kilometer for Canadian provinces was down-
loaded electronically from the Statistics Canada Web site, at www.statcan.ca,
using the following steps: select learning resources; select E-STAT; select ta-
ble of contents; select people; select data; select population and demography;
from the census databases select population characteristics; select 2001 pop-
ulation and dwelling counts; select the desired item from the list. One square
mile is 2.59 square kilometers.
For US states population density per square mile is collected from Ta-
ble 19, Statistical abstract of the United States 2002, US Census Bureau,
available online at http://www.census.gov/statab/www/.
For both Canada and the US these numbers are from 2001.
A.3.5 Fraction with a university degree
For Canada this fraction is given by the number of persons 15 years and
over with a university (Bachelor) degree, divided by total population 15 and
over. The number of persons with a degree are from Statistics Canada,
2001 Census, downloaded electronically from the Statistics Canada Web
site, www.statcan.ca, following these steps: select census; select search by
topic; select education in Canada: school attendance and levels of schooling;
click on number 1 (under topic-based tabulations) — detailed highest level
of schooling. Total population numbers are from the same Web site: select
census; select search by topic; select age and sex; click on number 2, “proﬁle
of age and sex.”
The US data is the fraction of the population with a Bachelor degree
or more for persons 25 years old and over, based on the 2000 census, from
27Table 231, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2003, US Census Bureau,
available at http://www.census.gov/statab/www/.
The Canadian data is from 2001 and the US data from 2000.
A.3.6 Political variables
Fraser Institute indicators We use six political indicators constructed
by the Fraser Institute (FI), a Canadian think tank. These are meant to
measure “economic freedom” and/or the ﬂexibility of labor markets and take
values on a scale from 1 to 10. Indicators A to D below are from Karabegovi´ c
et al. (2004); indicators E and F from Clemens et al. (2004).
Indicator A: “Size of the government” is an index measuring general gov-
ernment consumption expenditures relative to GSP or GPP. A higher score
means smaller government.
Indicator B: “Discriminatory taxation” is an index measuring how “dis-
criminatory” the tax system is; taxation is considered discriminatory if,
for instance, the link between taxes paid and services received is weak, or
marginal taxes are high. A higher score means less discriminatory taxation.
Indicator C: “Minimum wage legislation” is an index measuring the an-
nual income earned by someone working at the minimum wage relative to
per-capita GSP or GPP. A higher score means a higher minimum wage.
Indicator D: “Union density” is an index measuring the fraction of the
work force who is unionized. A higher score means that a larger fraction is
unionized.
Indicator E: “Average duration of unemployment” is an index measuring
just that. A higher score means longer unemployment duration.
Indicator F: “Flexibility in labor-relation laws” is an index measuring the
ﬂexibility in diﬀerent areas of labor law. A higher score means that labor
laws are more ﬂexible.
Government expenditure Aside from the variables from the Fraser In-
stitute we calculated three other political variables: the ratio of federal,
28state/provincial, and local government expenditure to income.
Data over government expenditures across Canadian provinces are from
Statistics Canada (2003, Table 7-9). We ﬁrst divided expenditure by popu-
lation to get it in per-capita terms; we then divided by per-capita personal
income to get the total expenditure as a fraction of income. Both population
and per-capita personal income by province were collected from Statistics
Canada (2003, Table 18).
The same data for US states are from Sagoo (2005; Tables C18, E15,
and F14). To get total expenditure as a fraction of income we divided per-
capita expenditures by per-capita personal income (collected from Table A14
in Ibid.).
These sources are partly the same as those used to calculate FI’s index
over the size of government (Indicator A above).
For both Canada and the US the numbers are from 2002.
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Figure 2. Temperature and population density for Atlantic states and provinces. 
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Figure 10: University education and per-capita income. BC
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Figure 18: Slavery and university education across slave states. 
 State or  Per-capita GSP or State or  Per-capita GSP or
province or GPP (US$), 1999 province or GPP (US$), 1999
1 Connecticut CT Hartford 46,245 31 Tennessee TN Nashville 31,017
2 Delaware DE Dover 46,008 32 Indiana IN Indianapolis 30,659
3 Alaska AK Juneau 42,539 33 Kansas KS Topeka 30,460
4 Massachusetts MA Boston 42,519 34 Arizona AZ Phoenix 30,070
5 New York NY Albany 41,469 35 Iowa IA Des Moines 29,707
6 New Jersey NJ Trenton 40,713 36 South Dakota SD Pierre 29,505
7 Nevada NV Carson City 38,615 37 Louisiana LA Baton Rouge 29,496
8 Colorado CO Denver 37,900 38 Utah UT Salt Lake City 29,411
9 California CA Sacramento 37,082 39 New Mexico NM Santa Fe 29,328
10 New Hampshire NH Concord 36,823 40 Florida FL Tallahassee 29,309
11 Illinois IL Springfield 36,746 41 Vermont VT Montpelier 28,908
12 Wyoming WY Cheyenne 36,380 42 Kentucky KY Frankfort 28,665
13 Washington WA Olympia 36,352 43 South Carolina SC Columbia 27,515
14 Minnesota MN Saint Paul 36,223 44 Maine ME Augusta 27,185
15 Georgia GA Atlanta 35,402 45 Idaho ID Boise 27,183
16 Virginia VA Richmond 35,243 46 North Dakota ND Bismarck 26,814
17 Alberta AB Edmonton 34,540 47 Quebec QC Quebec City 26,432
18 Hawaii HI Honolulu 34,512 48 Alabama AL Montgomery 26,333
19 Texas TX Austin 34,288 49 Saskatchewan SK Regina 26,094
20 North Carolina NC Raleigh 33,799 50 British Columbia BC Victoria 26,086
21 Maryland MD Annapolis 33,782 51 Oklahoma OK Oklahoma City 25,724
22 Oregon OR Salem 33,079 52 Arkansas AR Little Rock 25,388
23 Rhode Island RI Providence 32,848 53 Manitoba MB Winnipeg 25,328
24 Ontario ON Toronto 32,373 54 Montana MT Helena 23,376
25 Nebraska NE Lincoln 32,259 55 Mississippi MS Jackson 23,220
26 Ohio OH Columbus 32,157 56 West Virginia WV Charleston 22,516
27 Pennsylvania PA Harrisburg 31,931 57 Nova Scotia NS Halifax 22,336
28 Wisconsin WI Madison 31,708 58 New Brunswick NB Fredericton 22,187
29 Michigan MI Lansing 31,257 59 Newfoundland NL St. John's 21,008
30 Missouri MO Jefferson City 31,174 60 Prince Edward Island PE Charlottetown 20,545
Rank Rank
Table 1: List of states/provinces and per-capita incomes
Notes: Canadian provinces in bold. GSP stands for Gross State Product, GPP for Gross Province Product. Incomes are PPP adjusted.
Capital Capital Code CodeLog per-capita  Fraction with  Urbanization  Log population  Log population 
GSP or GPP university degree rate density 2001 density 1900
Log per-capita GSP or GPP 1.000    
Fraction with university degree 0.723 1.000    
Urbanization rate 0.647 0.393 1.000  
Log population density 2001 0.508 0.654 0.334 1.000
Log population density 1900 0.176 0.361 0.009 0.841 1.000
Table 2: Correlation matrix
Notes: Correlation coefficients based on all 60 states and provinces, except for the last row which excludes Newfoundland (which 
lacks population density data for 1900).(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9.811 9.719 9.231 9.206 9.684 9.926 9.566 9.596
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fraction with 2.297 2.642 1.661 2.311 2.627 2.456 2.716 2.709
university degree (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.074 0.128 0.207 0.055 0.012 0.164 0.112




 taxation (FI) ( 0.000)
Average unem- 0.003




 labor laws (FI) (0.474)
Minimum-wage 0.016
 legislation (FI) (0.172)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
9.184 10.184 9.747 9.540 10.045 9.615 9.595 9.396
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fraction with 1.347 1.898 2.573 2.698 1.997 3.193 3.015 3.894
university degree (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.032 0.032 0.062 0.147 0.094 0.145 0.124 0.210




 taxation (FI) ( 0.006)
Average unem- 0.006




 labor laws (FI) ( 0.392)
Minimum-wage 0.008
 legislation (FI) ( 0.329)
Ratio of federal -1.174 -1.212
expenditure to income ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
Ratio of state -0.021 0.026
expenditure to income ( 0.378) ( 0.240)
Ratio of local 1.416 0.944
expenditure to income ( 0.060) ( 0.160)
Fraction working -2.479 -2.530
in fisheries ( 0.156) (  0.115)
Fraction working in na- 3.313 5.188
tural resource industries ( 0.027) ( 0.004)








Size of government (FI)
60 60
30 60 60 60 60




Notes: FI denotes data from the Fraser Institute; see Section A.3.6 in the appendix for explanations of what a high/low score means.  P-values in 
parentheses.
Panel B: specifications (9) to (16)
Table 3: Higher education and per-capita income: ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable is log per-capita GSP or GPP





Size of government (FI)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
9.686 9.619 9.565 9.556 9.467 9.624
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fraction with 2.776 3.046 3.265 3.314 3.411 3.038
university degree (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.252)
0.100 0.081 0.106 0.109 0.120 0.077
(0.393) (0.483) ( 0.359) ( 0.260) ( 0.230) ( 0.819)
Log population -0.001
density 1900 ( 0.955)
0.055
( 0.712)
Fraction slaves  -0.029
in 1850 (0.913)
Hansen J statistic 0.393 0.114 0.595 0.553 0.377 0.596
Degrees of freedom 1 1 2 1 1 1






density 1900 ( 0.128)
-0.048
(0.133)
Fraction slaves  -0.091 -0.101
in 1850 (0.001) (0.001)
Partial R-squared
of excluded instruments
F-statistic for joint 
significance of excl. instr.
F-test (p-value) (0.003) ( 0.004)




Notes: Two-stage least squares estimations with heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors. Dependent variable is log per-capita GSP or GPP. The instrumented variable is
fraction with university degree. The p-values in parentheses refer to a t-test in the first-





















Table 4: Two-stage least squares regressions: 
0.005
Constant
Dependent variable is log per-capita GSP or GPP
Instrumented variable is fraction with university degreeInstrumented
variable is:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10.306 10.292 10.313 10.187 10.730 11.273
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient for 0.024 0.040 0.015 0.055 -0.316 -0.759
instrumented variable (0.275) (0.064) (0.557) (0.068) (0.186) (0.027)
-0.171 -0.174 -0.184 -0.088 -0.248 -0.282
(0.036) (0.054) ( 0.083) ( 0.460) ( 0.000) ( 0.007)
Fraction slaves -0.342 -0.514 -0.482
in 1850 (0.092) (0.019) (0.011)
Hansen J statistic 2.477 1.248 3.597 1.156 9.027 1.407
Degrees of freedom 2 1 2 1 2 1





F-statistic for joint 
significance of excl. instr.
F-test (p-value)
No.of observations
Dependent variable is log per-capita GSP or GPP
smaller set of geography instruments








(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000)
13.07 12.32 7.96
0.461 0.256
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000)
-0.176
(0.044) (0.029) ( 0.673)
( 0.752)
-0.005 -0.004 -0.0002
Notes: Two-stage least squares estimations with heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors. Dependent variable is log per-capita GSP or GPP. Sex ratio is the number of men
per woman. The p-values in parentheses refer to a t-test in the first-stage regression and
a z-test in the second-stage regression. In columns (1), (3), and (5) only the indicated
variables (log population density in 1900 and 2001, and the sex ratio in 1900) are
instrumented, one at a time. In columns (2), (4), and (6) also the fraction slaves is
instrumented, although the first-stage regression for fraction slaves is not reported.
Second-stage results
-16.09 -10.49 0.803














(0.362) (0.000) ( 0.776)
0.019Instrumented
variable is: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
10.305 10.302 10.175 10.189 10.216 10.140 9.451 9.412
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coefficient for 0.039 0.040 0.058 0.055 0.261 0.369 3.709 3.873
instrumented variable (0.054) (0.022) (0.056) (0.032) (0.256) (0.095) (0.006) (0.004)
Fraction slaves -0.450 -0.458 -0.556 -0.535 -0.258 -0.275 0.019 0.002
in 1850 (0.011) (0.004) ( 0.001) ( 0.000) ( 0.106) ( 0.062) (0.930) (  0.992)
-0.186 -0.184 -0.079 -0.090 -0.252 -0.250 0.202 0.220
(0.027) (0.030) (0.518) (0.428) (0.000) (0.000) (0.244) ( 0.212)
Hansen J statistic 4.192 4.839 2.046 2.066 4.787 6.989 0.562 4.592
Degrees of freedom 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Chi-Sqr test (p-value) ( 0.242) (0.304) (0.563) (0.724) (0.188) (0.136) (0.905) ( 0.331)
-12.33 -9.32 -10.20 -7.71 -0.547 -0.378 0.227 0.238
( 0.224) ( 0.279) ( 0.112) (0.139) ( 0.308) ( 0.474) (0.255) ( 0.216)
-1.26 -1.34 -2.54 -2.60 0.13 0.13 -0.126 -0.126
(0.194) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.081) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000)
0.49 0.37 0.45 0.35 0.04 0.03 0.001 0.001
( 0.199) ( 0.258) (0.056) ( 0.066) (0.031) (0.074) (0.804) (0.861)
Average temperature -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 0.000
Squared (0.198) (0.281) (0.081) (0.116) (0.069) (0.167) (0.714) (0.779)
Average 0.046 0.048 0.003 0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.0009 -0.0009
precipitation (0.027) (0.016) (0.869) (0.798) (0.001) (0.000) (0.144) (0.148)
Average number -0.005 -0.008 0.001 -0.0014 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001
of rainy days ( 0.679) ( 0.426) (0.851) ( 0.817) (0.065) (0.111) (0.421) (0.475)
1.33 1.65 1.39 1.65 0.08 0.10 0.030 0.031
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.047) (0.022) (0.016)
1.84 1.52 0.10 0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.706)
Partial R-squared
of excluded instruments
F-statistic for joint 
significance of excl. instr.
F-test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ( 0.001) (0.000) (0.035) ( 0.030)
No. of observations 59 59 60 60 60 60 60 60
Canada dummy
Notes: Two-stage least squares estimations with heteroskedasticity-robuststandard errors. Dependent variable is
log per-capita GSP or GPP. The p-values in parentheses refer to a t-test in the first-stage regression and a z-test
in the second-stage regression. Both the fraction slaves and the indicated demography variables are
























Dependent variable is log per-capita GSP or GPP
Table 6: Two-stage least squares regressions: larger set of geography instruments
university degree
Fraction with
Urbanization rate
Log population
density 2001
Log population
density 1900